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NLRB v. LENKURT ELECTRIC CO.-WHEN
ARE EMPLOYERS' STATEMENTS TO
EMPLOYEES IMPERMISSIBLE?
In 1968 the San Francisco local of the International Printing
Pressmen & Assistants' Union' sought to become certified as the bargaining representative of fourteen nonunion employees in the Publications Service Department of the Lenkurt Electric Company manufacturing plant. The representation election was held and resulted in a rejection of the union. The union then filed an unfair labor practices
charge with the National Labor Relations Board. The charge objected
to certain conduct of the company which allegedly had affected the
outcome of the election.2
Part of the union's charges were based on certain pre-election
statements made by Linka, the company's print shop supervisor to the
employees under his direction. The union alleged that the statements
constituted unfair labor practices in that they constituted threats of
reprisal should the union be voted in. 3 Linka had told the employees
under his supervision that if the union were elected certain adverse
consequences would probably result. Their working hours might be
strictly regulated, smock and laundry service might be eliminated,
their sick leave might not be granted, and a lesser grade paper might
be used which would cause more problems for the operators of the
printing machines. Further, the supervisor was alleged to have told
two employees that if the union represented the workers, there was a
possibility they would be laid off and that one might forfeit her pension. 4
The company, Lenkurt Electric, contended that the supervisor's
discussions with the employees were merely good faith predictions and
were thus protected by section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act," which permits the expression of any "views, arguments or opin1. San Francisco & Vicinity Printing Pressmen Offset & Assistants' Union
No. 24, International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North America,
AFL-CIO.
2. NLRB v. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 438 F.2d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1971).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1106-07.
5. Id. at 1105. Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c) (1970), provides: "The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or
1329
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ion" by the employer so long as they contain no "threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit." The union, on the other hand,
claimed that Linka's statements constituted threats of reprisal for supporting the union and were therefore proscribed by the same section
of the act.6
In its findings, the board agreed with the union and concluded
that Lenkurt Electric Company had committed an unfair labor practice. The board ordered that the representation election be set aside,'
and applied to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement of
the order. Enforcement, however, was denied by the Ninth Circuit
in the recent case of NLRB v. Lenkurt Electric Co.8 This note will
analyze the court's decision in light of criteria developed by this and
other courts to evaluate employer conduct in a labor representation
election setting. The discussion will indicate that Linka's statements
were not measured by all the available standards, but instead, by the
Ninth Circuit's preference for an interpretation giving the widest protection to employer speech.
Right of Self Organization vs. Freedom of Speech
The Ninth Circuit characterized the primary issue in Lenkurt
as basically one of determining, in the context of the particular facts
involved, the scope of First Amendment protections accorded employer
speech. The decision indicated that, as between two possible constructions of an employer's statement, preference should be given to
the more expansive interpretation which will uphold the employer's
right to free speech.9 In this respect, the court purported to maintain
the delicate balance between the rights of employers and employees
which had already been established by the body of decisions in union
campaign cases since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise

of benefit."
6. 438 F.2d at 1104-05. Determining whether an employer's statement is a
"threat" or a "prediction" is the essence of the question of whether an unfair labor
practice has been committed. The distinction between the terms may be phrased
broadly in that an allowable prediction must be grounded on objective facts, of consequences likely to occur, which may lawfully take place once a union is voted in.
If, however, a statement represents or implies that the employer, of his own volition
and for reasons not demonstratively related to economic necessity, will bring about a

certain inopportune event, the statement is a prohibited threat.

A more detailed

discussion of these standards is provided at notes 29-62 & accompanying text infra.
7. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 169 NLRB 941, 943 (1968).
8. 438 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1971).

9.

Id. at 1108.
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(NLRA). 0 While the NLRA provided important substantive rights
for the employee, 1 the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech
was also preserved for the employer.12 Conversely, the employer could
not, under the protection of his First Amendment rights, interfere with
his employees in the exercise of theirs.'"
By favoring a broader interpretation of the employer's statements
in Lenkurt, the court apparently enunciated a new standard for determining the extent of protection to be given the rights of both employer
and employee, the doctrine of "expansive interpretation." The Ninth
Circuit, as well as other courts, has been required to formulate many
standards in four decades of cases involving employer free speech in

labor representation situations. The court in Lenkurt enumerated many
of these standards' 4 for evaluating employer speech, but appears to have

10. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). The Supreme
Court rejected employer's contention that its First Amendment rights had been
interfered with by the board's action under authority of the NLRA: "[The Act does
not enjoin] the employer from expressing its view on labor policies or problems nor is
a penalty imposed upon it because of any utterances which it has made. The sanctions
of the Act are imposed .. .for the protection of the employees. The employer...
is .. .free to take any side it may choose on this controversial issue." Id. at 477.
In a decision made after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, which added section
8(c) to the NLRA, the Fifth Circuit characterized that section as the balancing point
between the employer's right of free speech and the rights of the employees to organize.
Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1967). That section 8(c)
specifically singles out employer speech for protection does not, of course, mean that
such speech was not entitled to protection prior to the enactment of the section.
Shortly after the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted, the Seventh Circuit argued that the
section was but a restatement of the principle, etsablished earlier (NLRB v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., supra) that while the employer was guaranteed his First Amendment rights, these were not to be used as a shield to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by the Act. NLRB v.
La Salle Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 1949); NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co.,
178 F.2d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 1949).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
12. See, e.g., Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir.
1970).
13. NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, 913-15 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. deied, 312 U.S. 689 (1941). See also Note, Restrictions on the Employer's Right of
Free Speech During Organizing Campaigns and Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw. U.L.
REv. 40, 43 (1968).
14. In quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969), the
opinion mentions the following standards: predictions must be carefully phrased on
the basis of objective fact; they must convey the employer's belief as to demonstratively probable consequences; there must be consequences beyond his control; the
eventuality predicted must be capable of proof; if there is any implication that an
employer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only to him, the statement is an unprotected
threat. 438 F.2d at 1105-06. In citing NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
314 U.S. 469 (1941), the opinion also noted that "statements must be considered in
the context of the factual background in which they are made, and in view of the

1332

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

primarily relied upon the doctrine of "expansive interpretation"-upholding the employer's right to free speech-to support its denial of
the board's decision in the case. However, a more searching analysis
of the facts in the case, using the previous standards which have been
developed by the courts in decisions involving union elections, seems
to indicate that there is little support for the conclusion reached by
the Ninth Circuit in Lenkurt. Rather, the finding of the board-that
the employer's statements amounted to real threats-appears the more
accurate interpretation, and more in keeping with the prior judicial
construction of the applicable sections of the NLRA.
The essential question in the case turns on the court's preference
for the doctrine that employer speech should be broadly rather than
narrowly construed in order to protect employer First Amendment
rights. Rigid adherence to this doctrine, however, forced the court
into an unstructured choice between characterizing Linka's statements
as either prohibited "threats" or permissible "predictions." Because
of the court's predisposition in favor of upholding employer speech,
the ultimate decision in the case was that the statements of the employer were merely predictions.
The court's disproportionate reliance on the "expansive interpretation" doctrine renders the decision questionable, since other equally
important standards were ignored. Among these is the long established
tenet that the board's reasonable interpretation of the facts should be
upheld by the courts. 15 Similarly, the court failed to consider the
fundamental principle that the provisions of the NLRA do not allow
the employer's rights to be promoted over those of the employees.' 6
Early in the history of the NLRA, the courts recognized that the statute
was not intended to be used to abridge an employer's First Amendment
rights; 1 7 however, the courts further stated that the mere fact that the
employer's conduct exerting pressure on the employees was manifested
totality of employer conduct." 438 F.2d at 1107. The majority opinion also stresses
its contention that union campaigns should be vigorous and uninhibited, and that
toward that end employer speech should not be restricted by narrow construction.

Id. at 1108. The majority bases its decision on the question of whether there was a
"basis in objective fact" for the statements, on a consideration of the totality of employer conduct, and on the premise that speech should be broadly construed so as to

foster vigorous and uninhibited debate in union campaigns.
15.
16.

See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
See Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1967).

17.

The National Labor Relations Act was enacted in 1935.

Prods. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1940), the court stated:

In Midland Steel
"[Nleither state-

ment of fact nor expression of opinion by the employer is prohibited by the statute,
and if they were, the statute would contravene the free speech provision of the First

Amendment." Id. at 804. This decision was prior to 1947, when the act was
amended to provide for employer free speech protection in the form of section 8(c).
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
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in terms of speech did not put that conduct beyond the reach of otherwise applicable administrative limitations. 13
The language of section 8(c), which was incorporated into the
iLRA by the Taft-Hartley Act, was a restatement of the principle embodied in the First Amendment 9 and manifested a congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues divising labor and management. 20 The section articulates the scope of First Amendment protection for employer speech, and prohibits employer language which
conveys
to employees a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 21 This limitation is intented to prevent interference with the employees' rights to self-organization, which are embodied in section 7 of
the NLRA:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other conof collective bargaining or other
certed activities for the purpose
2
mutual aid or protection ..... 2
Employees' rights to self-organization are further protected by section
8(a)(1), which declares that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interefere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed [in section 7 of the act]."' 23 Section 8(c)
also protects employee rights by providing that employer speech containing threats of reprisal or force or promise of benefit constitutes an
unfair labor practice.2 4 The thrust of section 8(c) is to balance the
employer's right to speak freely with the employees' rights to organize
without intervention. 3
In most cases involving unfair labor practices, the presence or
absence of economic interference by the employer has emerged as the
key factor in implementing the balancing of employee-employer inter18. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941): "[Clertainly conduct, though evidenced in part by speech, may amount in connection with
[Iun determinother circumstances to coercion within the meaning of the Act....
ing whether a course of conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure exerted vocally by the employer may no more be disregarded than pressure exerted in other

ways."
19.
20.
ganizing
21.
22.

23.

See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
Note, Restrictions on the Employer's Right of Free Speech During OrCampaigns and Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw. U.L. R.v. 40, 46 (1968).
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
Id. § 157.

Id. § 158(a)(1).

24. See Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1967).

25. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). Any balancing of
those rights must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their
employers. See Note, Restrictions on the Employer's Right of Free Speech During
OrganizingCampaignsand Collective Bargaining,63 Nw. U.L. REV. 40, 61.
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ests.26 Menacing speech by the employer is excepted from protection
to prevent an employer from exercising his economic power over the
employees by threatening retribution should they support the union,
since such tactics are not deemed to contribute to the exchange of
views that the Constitution and section 8(c) seek to promote.27
Employer's arguments regarding potentially detrimental effects
should unionization take place directed to his employees have a specious character. Though the employer's statements may seem, on their
face, legitimate enough, and could on this basis, possibly be justified
under the privilege of free speech, because of the relationship between
the speaker and the listener they generally have a force that goes beyond mere instruction or persuasion. The NLRB has been vested by
Congress with the power to measure these factors against each other;
that is, to balance the employer's right to speak freely against the employees right not to be unduly pressured, a power whose exercise does
not encroach upon the First Amendment.2 8
While the NLRA is clear in disallowing threats of reprisal, there
are no statutory formulas for determining what will be deemed to constitute such threats. The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, in
reviewing decisions of the board in unfair labor practice cases, have
evolved certain criteria by which employer's statements may be evaluated to determine whether they are permissible opinions or prohibited
threats. The board may also use these standards in making the original determination of whether there has been an unfair labor practice,
26. See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 69 (1964).
27. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941). Learned Hand

prefaced the observation with these words: "The privilege of 'free speech', like other
privileges, is not absolute; it has its seasons; a democratic society has an acute interest
in its protection and cannot indeed live without it, but it is an interest measured by
its purpose.

That purpose is to enable others to make an informed judgment as to

what concerns them, and ends so far as the utterances do not contribute to the result.
Language may serve to enlighten a hearer, though it also betrays a speaker's feelings

and desires; but the light it sheds will be in some degree clouded, if the hearer is in his
power."

Id.

Federbush also stood for the broader proposition that an employer must

remain strictly neutral with regard to the issues in a union representation election.
This contention was undone in NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469
(1941), but the Federbush position on the special nature of employer speech has
been reiterated even after Virginia Electric and after the imposition of section 8(c).
See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969), "[Any balancing
of [employer and employee] rights must take into account the economic dependence
of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be
more readily deceived by a disinterested ear." NLRB v. McCormick Concrete Co.,
371 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1966); Daniel Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 805, 811
(4th Cir. 1965).
28. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
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and the reviewing court will utilize the standards to test the reasonableness of the board's conclusion. Certain of these judicially created criteria were intended to be used primarily for an analysis of the statement in isolation, while others were designed to probe the effect of
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement in determining the statement's legitimacy.
Standards for Assessing the Effect of the
Background of Employer Speech
Even prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,"' which included express provisions proscribing coercive employer speech, the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.10 recognized the employer's right to free speech in labor relations settings, but
directed that in order to determine whether an employer's speech was
noncoercive, the totality of his conduct surrounding the speaking must
also be examined. This "totality of conduct" standard was not overriden by the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Especially during the past decade, the courts and the NLRB have
placed significant emphasis on the background and context of employer's statements, and the existence of an unfair labor practice has
often been determined not by a finding that the words themselves were
prohibited, but that they had a prohibited meaning within the context
in which they were uttered.3 1 The Supreme Court, in the recent case
of Gissel Packing Co. v. NLRB, 32 specifically noted that very few
cases involve instances of outright threats by the employer; nevertheless, speech that would appear perfectly legitimate to a disinterested
listener will be prohibited by section 8(c) if, because of the surrounding circumstances, it might have a coercive impact upon the employee. 33
The assessment of the effect of the background of an employer's statements upon their legitimacy has not been limited only to an inquiry
into his conduct. The following circumstances have also been closely
scrutinized by the courts in determining the propriety of the employer's
statements.
The traditional adversary relationship between employers and employees regarding unionization has been acknowledged and considered
by the courts in conjunction with the economic dependence of the em29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-531 (1970).
30. 314 U.S. 469, 479 (1941).
31. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 75 (C. Morris
ed. 1970). Compare NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.
1967) with NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).

32. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
33.

Id.
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ployees upon the employer.3 4 In a union organization debate, the employer is seldom a disinterested party making objective observations,
and his words may carry disproportionate influence and hidden meanings. If the employer-employee relationship taints the employer's otherwise legitimate speech with prohibited implications which the empolyee might perceive, the speech is not protected by section 8(c).",
The physical setting in which the employer's statements are made
is another circumstance that might color their legitimacy.3"
In Lenkurt the statements of Linka, the supervisor, had been made at a series
of meetings in Linka's office during the two week period immediately
preceding the union representation election. Each meeting had been
attended by three or four employees, and each employee had attended
three or four meetings.3 7 The board, in its consideration of these
factors, observed that the "systematic interviews for the purpose of exposing employees to antiunion propaganda not dissimilar to those
conducted by Linka have been held inherently coercive . ...
The courts have also held that the extent to which the employeelisteners are familiar with the facts which form the basis for the employer's statements is another element to be considered in analyzing
the context of his speech and in determining its coercive effect within
that context. If an employer maintains that unionization will bring
about certain adverse economic results affecting the employees, the
employees should be informed as to the facts which dictate the employer's conclusions. In Lenkurt, as Judge Browning indicated in his
dissent, the causes of the hardships predicted by Linka were identified
only vaguely and in most general terms."
Further, there were inconsistencies between the asserted bases for Linka's statements and the
information provided to the employees by the Pressmen Union's sam34.

Id.

35.

See id. at 617.

The language of section 8(c) is but a restatement of the

freedom of speech principle embodied in the First Amendment. NLRB v. La Salle
Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829, 835 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1947). "The use

of economic power over men and their jobs to influence their action is more than the
exercise of freedom of speech."

NLRB v. Continental Oil Co., 159 F.2d 326, 330

(10th Cir. 1947).
36. See P.R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 704, 707-08 (7th Cir. 1967).
37.

438 F.2d at 1112.

38. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 169 NLRB 941, 943 (1968).
"When rank-and-file
employees are brought to the company offices in small groups, they do not deal in an
"arms length" relationship with the company officials they are directed to see.

Anti-

union opinions, and the suggestion that the employees reject the union, when
uttered in that locus of final authority in the plant, take on a meaning and a significance they do not possess under other circumstances. The coercive effect may be
subtle, but it is nonetheless there." General Shoe Corp., 97 NLRB 499, 502
(1951).
39. 438 F.2d at 1114 (Browning, J.,
dissenting).
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pie contract distributed to the employees by the union.40 Unless the
employees have sufficient knowledge to be able to recognize that the
employer's contentions are reasonable ones, they might well conclude
that what is intended by the employer's speech is a threat of retaliation,
rather than a prognostication of unavoidable economic difficulty. 41
Thus, the actual words of the employer must be evaluated not
in isolation, but with all these relevant considerations in mind-the
whole of the employer's conduct, the adversary employer-employee relationship in labor matters, the economic dependence of the employee
upon the employer, the physical context of the employer's speech,
and the extent of the employees' knowledge of the facts relating to
the employer's statements. Further, these considerations should be examined by the court to determine not whether in fact the words did
coerce the employee-listeners, but whether they evidenced a reasonable
tendency to coerce. A finding by the court that the employer's speech
had a reasonable tendency to coerce the employees is sufficient to support the conclusion that the words amounted to an unfair labor prac42
tice.
The court in Lenkurt acknowledged that employer statements
must be considered "in the context of the factual background in which
they were made, and in view of the totality of employer conduct.1 43
However, the court appears to have considered only evidence as to
the lack of antiunion animus on the part of Linka or of his company.44
Whereas an employer's sentiments about unionism may be relevant to
an inquiry into his conduct surrounding a union election, they should
not be deemed determinative of the question whether an unfair labor
practice has been committed.4 5 What is sought to be prevented by
40. Id. at 1113-14.
41. Where an employer predicts that unionization will result in certain untoward economic events, and he has it within his power to make the prediction
come true, he must either accompany his assertion with some reasonable basis for it,
or it must appear that the basis was so widely known that the employees may
fairly be presumed to have known it or to have been able to discover it. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
If a reasonable basis is not clearly seen, there will be no apparent economic causeand-effect relationship between the entry of the union and the predicted events, so
that the employer statements could properly be interpreted as likely to instill a fear in
employees that retaliatory actions might result from their activities. NLRB v. Yokell,
387 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 1967).
42. NLRB v. Standard Container Co., 428 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. Kingsford, 313 F.2d 826, 832 (6th Cir. 1963).
43. 438 F.2d at 1107.
44. Id.
45. Defeat of employees' rights to self organization does not necessarily depend on the existence of an antiunion bias. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379
U.S. 21, 22-23 (1964). It is the effect rather than the motivation of an employer's

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

the limitations imposed on an employer's speech is not a base intention
on the part of the employer, but a certain effect-that is, possible restrictions on the employees' right to self organization and employer
speech may have such an effect even absent an antiunion bias on his
part. The criteria to be utilized by the court in evaluating the employer speech, and that from the background of an employer's utterances and thus affect their propriety, are not to be disregarded on the
basis of the employer's subjective intent in making the statements.
Standards to Evaluate the Legitimacy of
Employer Speech in Isolation
By other criteria, the propriety of employer's speech may be examined in relative isolation-that is, without reference to the collateral
factors described in the above section. When utilizing this type of analysis, the primary issue before the court would be whether the disjunct
statements of the employer contain a threat of force or reprisal in
themselves. While the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act which protect employer speech are phrased in terms of "opinions," not every
statement by an employer which is couched in terms of uncertainty
will be protected.4 6 An employer's conjecture that certain inopportune economic events may follow from unionization is not free from
scrutiny by the court merely because it is framed equivocally. Where
the prediction expressly or impliedly indicates that the employer will
use his economic power to make such conjecture come true, his words
take on the character of a prohibited threat.4 To come under the protection of the statutory provisions, the employer's statement must be a
reasonable prediction based on available fact. 8
An important factor in determining whether an utterance is protected is the employer's power to control the occurrence of the ecoaction which determines whether an unfair labor practice has been committed.
NLRB v. McCatron, 216 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1954).
46. NLRB v. Louisiana Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1967). A company
representative told employees, among other things, that a union contract might result in a loss of miscellaneous work so the employees would be sent home when their
machines broke down, a loss of the deer-hunting time off privilege, and a loss of overtime work. While these are statements couched in terms of uncertainty, the court
concluded that they were not necessarily "opinions protected by 8(c)." Id. at 701-02.
47. "LAin employer is free to tell his employees what he reasonably believes
will be the likely economic consequences of unionization that are outside his control,
as distinguished from threats of economic reprisal to be taken solely on his own volition." NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1967). Whether these
threats are express or can be implied under the circumstances is irrelevant to the
issue of whether an unfair labor practice has been committed. Santa Fe Drilling
Co. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 725, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1969).
48. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757, 763 (D.C.
Cir. 1960).
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nomic events predicted.4" Lenkurt Electric Co. had that power; either
Linka himself or the company had the ability to restrict the employees'
working hours, tightly control their coffee breaks and lunch hours,
eliminate sick leave, stop providing smock and laundry service, use
lesser grade paper stocks, and discharge employees which could result
in forfeit of the employees' pensions." Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that the employer's "predictions," coupled with his power to
effectuate the consequence, might have produced an atmosphere of
coercion.
The Third Circuit recently ruled that, "the employer must eliminate [this coercive atmosphere] by demonstrating to the employees
that the predicted consequences are, in fact, economically dictated in
the given circumstances." 51 The majority in Lenkuwt stated that Linka's statements were proper and not coercive because "there was such
a factual basis for all the predictions made. The suggested necessity
of eliminating the smock and laundry service and of using a lower
grade of paper stock arose out of anticipated higher wage costs." 52
However, the mere contention that there would be an increase in costs
is not sufficient to justify the inherently coercive statements. The prediction must be a good faith prediction, grounded on specific facts,
that show that costs will become to high and that the operation, without taking the measures suggested, will become clearly uneconomical.
If the forecast of untoward economic events by the employer-Linka
in this case-is unrelated to the actual level of wages sought, the court
could properly conclude that the language threatens reprisal. The company had contended that the factual basis for Linka's statements regarding sick leave and the strict accounting of employees' time should
his department be unionized was his own personal observation of the
way other unionized departments in the company operated and his previous observations of and experience with other union organizations.
The Ninth Circuit apparently accepted the company's assertions as an
adequate factual basis.5 3 Of course, an employer's predictions as to
possible consequences which are likely to occur because of union activity
are proper if the employer's opinion or prediction is based on past
events or personal experience, if these are truthfully depicted.5 4 However, it would be clearly improper to describe consequences as "probable" or "likely" when there was no objective evidence adduced in
this regard.5 5 In Lenkurt Pressman's Local 24, which sought to repre49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

438 F.2d at 1106; NLRB v. Yokell, 387 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 1967).
438 F.2d at 1112.
Mon River Towing, Inc. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d 1, 10 (3d Cir. 1969).
438 F.2d at 1108.
Id.
P.R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 704, 707 (7th Cir. 1967).
NLRB v. CJ. Pearson Co., 420 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1969). It is improper
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sent the employees, had circulated a copy of the proposed union contract that included provisions for sick leave. 56 Whatever may have
been Linka's prior experience with labor unions, this particular contract, with its specific provisions for sick leave, undid the validity of
that prior experience as "objective basis in fact" for his prediction. In
addition, the fact that in other departments in the company required
a stricter accounting of employee time after unionization does not explain why the same result should necessarily follow in Linka's department. The Ninth Circuit indicated that regimentation of working
57
hours reasonably follows from imposition of an hourly wage scale.
However, this observation by the court, even if supported by a showing
of economic cause and effect, would not have provided an adequate
"basis in objective fact" in Lenkurt, since the proposed union contract
specified that wages would be paid on a weekly and not an hourly
5
basis.
Linka's prediction or opinion that employees could possibly lose
their jobs because they could not be shifted from the printing department to another department in slack periods was based, the company
said, on Linka's understanding that the Pressmen's Union would not
permit the shifting of employees between departments.5 9 It would seem
improbable that a union elected to represent fourteen employees in one
small department in a company having a work force of 3,500 would
take the position suggested. It is unlikely that the employees shared
Linka's understanding, so that it also fails as "reasonable basis in fact"
to support his communications. A prediction of inopportune economic
events based on misrepresentations or without sufficient factual basis
gives rise to an implication that an employer may choose to take action
according to his volition and for reasons unconnected to economic necessity. While the courts do not require that an employer be correct
in his predictions,60 only predictions reasonably grounded on fact are
protected.61 Otherwise, such predictions are properly characterized as
threats of retaliation, to which the First Amendment protection does
not extend. 62
Thus, it appears that, had the Ninth Circuit properly applied the
standards available to appraise an employer's statements-those which
for an employer to predict as probable or likely consequences not within his control
when in fact there is no objective evidence of their likelihood. Id. at 695.
56. 438 F.2d 1113 (Browning, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1106.
58. Id. at 1113 (Browning, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1115.
60. NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1967).
61. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757, 763 (D.C.
Cir. 1960).
62. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
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evaluate the words within the total context in which they were uttered,
as well as those which analyze their legitimacy in isolation-another
conclusion, different and opposite to the one found by the majority in
Lenkurt would have resulted. Both the board and Judge Browning in
his dissenting opinion thought that Linka's statements constituted
threats of retaliation which were not protected by the Taft-Hartley Act,
and thus were an unfair labor practice.
The Ninth Circuit and the Substantial Evidence Rule
Customarily, the appellate court's consideration of a case like
Lenkurt begins with an appraisal of the board's determination, rather
than with an appraisal of the challenged utterances themselves. Section 10(e) of the NLRA, which empowers the court to entertain petitions for enforcement of the board's order, prescribes that the findings of the board with respect to questions of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, are to be
deemed conclusive. 3 Since early in the history of the NLRA, courts
have held that the fact finding power of the NLRB includes the power
to infer such conclusions as may reasonably be based on the proven
facts.6 4 On review, the sole question to be determined by the court
is whether the inferences by the board are supported by substantial
evidence from the whole record. 5 If they are so supported, the court
of appeals is not authorized to disturb them, 6 even if a conflicting inference, seemingly more plausible, can be drawn from the facts.6 7 In
other words, the court should not substitute its own judgment for that
of the board. 68
The task of arriving at reasonable conclusions based on the facts
in the case was put within the exclusive province of the board because
one of the purposes which led to the creation of the NLRB was to
have decisions based upon evidential facts under the NLRA made by
63. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
64. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). "An administrative
agency with power after hearings to determine on the evidence in adversary proceedings whether violations of statutory commands have occurred may infer within the
limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such conclusions as reasonably may be
based on the facts proven. One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such
boards is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute
made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of
the subject which is entrusted to their administration." Id. at 800.
65. NLRB v. Pine Prods. Corp., 361 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1966); Foreman & Clark,
Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 398, 404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954).
66. Pacific Plywood Co. v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1963).
67. NLRB v. Superex Drugs, 341 F.2d 747, 749 (6th Cir. 1965).
68. NLRB v. Link Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 597 (1941); NLRB v. Kropp Forge
Co., 178 F.2d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 1949).
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experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities
of the subject entrusted to their administration.69 This expertise is
derived from the board's position, function, and ability to appraise conflicting and circumstantial evidence, the weight and credibility of testimony, and the imponderable subtleties which may tend to color and
alter the purport of the employer conduct in question. 70
The substantial evidence test has long been utilized by reviewing
courts as the proper basis for assessing the validity of the board's
findings. 7 ' Yet the test is not mentioned in the court's opinion in
Lenkurt. Although the court may have considered the test, and not
acknowledged it by name, indications are that the test was disregarded.
The only statement in the majority opinion which hints at a quantitative evaluation of evidence by the court is the one in which the court
finds "nothing in these expressions by the Company's supervisor to
constitute either an express or implied threat of retaliatory action by
the Company. '72 This, at most, indicates a mensural analysis of the
particular statements made by Linka, but not of the findings of the
board.
Perhaps the court disregarded the substantial evidence test because it considered itself at liberty to decide de novo the crucial issue
in this controversy-whether the particular utterances were a threatas a question of law. Some early court decisions, ostensibly recognizing that the problem was essentially one of balancing the right of free
speech by an employer against the right of assembly by the employees,
determined that this was a judicial equation exclusively for the court's
resolution." These early decisions were made prior to the enactment
of section 8(c) of the NLRA, 4 which certain courts and writers consider to be the congressional definition of the scope of First Amendment protection for the employer under the act. 7" Since these particular provisions were enacted, however, the courts have not proposed that
determination of whether certain utterances are threats or permitted
69.
70.
NLRB v.
71.
Evidence

Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945).
NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 476, 479 (1941);
Link Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 597 (1941).
NLRB v. Pine Prods. Corp., 361 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1966); Note, Substantial
Rule as Applied to Employer Free Speech Cases, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 529

(1968).
72. 438 F.2d at 1107.
73. NLRB v. Continental Oil Co., 159 F.2d 326, 329 (10th Cir. 1947); NLRB
v. J.L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F.2d 556, 564 (8th Cir. 1944).
74. June 23, 1947.
75. Gissel Packing Co. v. NLRB, 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969); NLRB v. La Salle
Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950);
Note, Restrictions on the Employer's Right of Free Speech During Organizing Campaigns and Collective Bargaining,63 Nw. U.L. REV. 40, 46 (1965).
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communications is exclusively for the courts. Whatever the classification of such determination-either as one of fact or one of law-the
Supreme Court has emphasized on numerous occasions the great weight
that the judiciary should accord to the findings of administrative bodies,
including the board. 6 The board is an agency which is particularly
enabled by experience to deal with a special field of knowledge, and
as such, its findings within that field carry an authority of expertise
which courts7 7do not generally possess and should therefore accord
some respect.
In Lenkurt the majority concluded that "[t]he statements of Linka
do not justify the strained interpretation given to them by the
Board .... ,,7s The question for the court is not, however, whether
the statements alone justify the board's conclusion, but whether from9
the whole body of evidence, there is support for that conclusion .
Nor is the question for the court whether in the light of that evidence
the board's conclusion is strained or facile, but whether it is reasonable
or absured.80
The work of applying the general prohibitory language of the
NLRA in view of the infinite combinations of events which might be
charged as violative of its terms has been given by Congress to the
board."1 If the board makes a reasonable conclusion that certain statements by an employer amounted to threats, the finding should not be
set aside on review, even though the court may conceivably arrive at
2
another, different conclusion.
These propositions-that predictions should be carefully phrased
on the basis of objective fact; that the bases for predictions should be
known to the employees; that predictions should be evaluated against
their particular factual background; that they should depict demonstratively probable consequences; that these consequences should be
beyond the speaker's control; that there should be an apparent cause
and effect relationship between unionization and the predicted event;
76. On questions of law, the experienced judgment of the board is entitled to
great weight. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 681-82 n.1 (1944).
It is for the board to draw inferences from the evidence. NLRB v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 270 (1938).

77. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
78. 438 F.2d at 1108.
79. 340 U.S. at 487; the Labor Management Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
(1970), imposed the requirement that the whole record should be canvassed
tain if there is substantial evidence for the board's findings.
80. It is the appellate court's congressionally imposed responsibility
that the board keeps within reasonable grounds. 340 U.S. at 490.
81. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
82. Id. at 488; NLRB v. Alcoa Mining Co., 425 F.2d 1128, 1130
1970); Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756, 760 (6th Cir. 1965).

§ 160(e)
to ascerto assure
(5th Cir.
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that the predictions should be considered in the light of the employeremployee relationship as regards union matters; that the statements
should be appraised from the standpoint of the listener-employee; that
even if only a reasonable tendency to coerce is found, the employer's
utterances should be considered objectionable-have been developed
as guidelines to help the court evaluate the board's application of sections 8(c) and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. The question for the reviewing court should be to determine whether, within the framework of
these tests, there is substantial evidence to support the board's conclusion that an unfair labor practice has been committed.
When a court, reviewing a determination of the board, fails to
rely on all the standards available, it must necessarily rely on a standard of its own. This appears to have been the case in Lenkurt. The
court's conclusion that the board's construction of the statements was
too narrow,8 3 and the language -utilized by the Ninth Circuit in stating
its conclusion regarding protection of free speech, prompt the inference
that the court has enunciated a new standard-that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the employer's communications in question is
to be preferred. A broader interpretation, however, does not safeguard, and might easily impinge upon, the employees' rights to selforganization. In failing to consider established standards for evaluating employer speech, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has disturbed
the precarious balance between employer and employee rights which
those standards formulated by the courts under the provisions of the
NLRA seek to preserve.
Alicia Ndvar Noyola*
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